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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
November 3, 1978 Conference
List 1, Sheet 2
No. 78-160
WILSON, et al.
claimants)

(rival land

Cert to CA 8
(Lay, Stephenson,
Henley)

v.
OMAHA INDIAN TRIBE & UNITED
STATES

Federal/Civil

Timely

No. 78-161

IOWA

(Same)

v.
OMAHA INDIAN TRIBE & UNITED
STATES

-

~

(Same)

(Same)

- 2 No. 78-162
RGP, INC., et al.

(Same)

(rival land claimants)

v.
OMAHA INDIAN TRIBE & UNITED
STATES
1.

SUMMARY:

(Same)

(Same)

Petrs in these consolidated cases challenge a ruling

by the CA 8 that reverses a DC judgment quieting title in petrs to 2900
acres of Iowa farmland on the east bank of the Missouri River.

The

effect of this reversal is to transfer this land to the United States
as trustee and to the Omaha Indian Tribe whose reservation lies on the
opposite side of the river. The United States and the Tribe claim that
a
the land is/part of the reservation transferred to the Iowa side of the
river by avulsive actions.

Petrs to the contrary contend that the land

is accretion to the Iowa riparian land or to the part of the bed of the
river owned by the State of Iowa.

.

V""

The CA 8 held that neither petrs nor

--

resps had proved accretion or avulsion, but that 25

u.s.c.

§

194 put

the burden of proof on petrs and therefore judgment had to be for resps.
Petrs variously attack § 194 as a violation of their Fifth Amendment
right to due process, as erroneously applied under the facts of these
cases, and as improperly extended to cover the State of Iowa.

They also

challenge the CA 8's application of federal and not state common law
with regard to accretion and avulsion, and claim that even if federal
common law was the appropriate standard, it was improperly applied here.
2.

FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW: In March of 1854 the United States
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(

entered into a treaty with the Omaha Indian Tribe.

By the terms of

that treaty certain land located in an area known as Blackbird Bend
was

reserved by the Tribe, which ceded to the United States all other

land west of the center of the main channel of the Missouri River.

At

the time of the treaty the reserved land within Blackbird Bend was
located on the west side of the Missouri River.

By 1923, however, the

river had moved more than two miles to the west of its 1854 position.
Petrs asserted before the DC and CA 8 that early movements of the Missour :
River had washed away much of the land within the original Blackbird Bend
area, and that the lands now claimed by the Tribe on the east side of

the Missouriwerethe product of soil that had accreted to the Iowa riparic
land. It therefore was not the same land that the Indians had obtained by
treaty.
From the 1940's petrs and their predecessors had occupied and
cultivated the land in dispute.

In April of 1975, with the assistance

of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and with the approval of the United
States, the Tribe seized possession of the land and is now farming it.
In conjunction with the United States, it also brought suit in the DC
to establish its title to the land.

Petrs counterclaimed to quiet

title in their names.
The DC found that the Tribe and the United States had failed to
prove that the river movements were controlled by the doctrine of
avulsion and held that the river had changed by reason of the erosion
of reservation land and accretion to Iowa riparian land.

The CA reversed .

The areas of disagreement between the CA and DC are as follows:
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A.

Choice of Law:

facts of the case.
law controlled.

The DC applied Nebraska law in evaluating the

The Tribe and the government asserted that federal

Although the general rule is that state law determines

the ownership of the banks and shore of waterways, the rule is subject
to the caveat that a body of federal common law has developed to determine the effect of a change in the bed of a stream or river that forms
an interstate boundary.

See,

~,

Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v.

Corvallis Sand & Gravel co., 429 U.S. 363, 375 (1977).

Federal common

law is applicable even if a single state is involved in a controversy
with a private party, as long as the interests of more than one state
are sufficiently implicated in the potential outcome.
\~

Here, according

to theCA, the reservation's boundary necessarily concerned the interstate boundary between Nebraska and Iowa.

Also the applicability of

federal law was dictated by the involvement of a reservation boundary
that was originally created by tFeaty. - See Oneida Indian Nation v.
county of Oneida, 414
B.

u.s.

Burden of Proof:

661, 677 (1974).
Section 194 of Title 25 of the United States

Code provides:
Trial of right of property7 burden of proof
In all trials about the right of property in
which an Indian may be a party on one side, and a
white person on the other, the burden of proof
shall rest upon the white person, whenever the
Indian shall make out a presumption of title in
himself from the fact of previous possession or
ownership •
..__.1

{Emphasis added.)

Section 194 was one of a number of prote~tive laws

that constituted the Ind;i..an Non-Intercourse Acts of 1834.
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The DC held that § 194 was not applicable in the instant controversy.

It's reasoning apparently was that application of§ 194 would

require the court to presume that the land originally occupied by the
Indians was exactly the same land that is the subject of these cases.
The CA disagreed, stating that the trial court's reasoning would
eviscerate the § 194 statutory burden, because it could be overcome by
a mere allegation that the Indian land had been destroyed by erosion.
That an 1867 survey established that land in the area now under dispute
belonged to the Tribe was sufficient to "make out a presumption of
title •

c.

from the fact of previous possession or ownership."
Merits:

The CA then turned to the merits and the lore of

accretion and avulsion.

It reje9ted the trial

cou~t's

position that

avulsion occurs only (1) when there is a sudden and erratic jump or
movement of the thalweg (the navigable channel of a river) and (2) the
land across which the thalweg

m~ves

remains identifiable.

And viewing

the evidence it concluded that petrs had only raised speculative inferences that the thalweg moved by accretion rather than avulsion.

There-

fore, under § 194 petrs had failed to meet their burden of proof and
title vested in the Tribe.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

A.

No. 78-160:

Petrs' central contention is that § 194 is invidiou £

racial discriminaEion in violation of the Due Process Clause of the

-

Fifth Amendment.

The issue was only discussed in a footnote by the CA

and was not discussed at all by the DCo

The CA relied on the following

I

•

6 (

passage from Morton v. Mancari, 417

u.s.

535, 554-55 (1974):

On numerous occasions this Court specifically
has upheld legislation that singles out Indians
for particular and special treatment. This unique
legal status is of long standing and its sources
are diverse. As long as the special treatment
can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of
Congress• unique obligation toward the Indians,
such legislative judgments will not be disturbed.
(Citations omitted.)

Petr claims that the CA 8 should have subjected

§ 194 to strict scrutiny.

Petrs also argue that the CA misconstrued § 194; it refers to
individual Indians, not to tribes.

Moreover, the CA construed § 194

to apply to all non-Indians, whether states, corporations or individuals.
Petrs cite an 1880 case of this Court where the term

11

White person, ..

as used in an Indian protection statute similar to § 194, was held not
to include black persons.
(1880).

United States v. Perryman, 100

u.s.

235

Also they claim that the Tribe has to prove avulsion before

§ 194 comes into play, because as a logical matter the Tribe could not

have had .. previous possession or ownership .. of the land if it was the
product of accretion.
Petrs also attack the application of federal common law.
that no state boundary issue is involved in this case.

They argue

As of 1943 Iowa

and Nebraska have agreed to a permanent boundary line and there is no
question in this case but that the land at issue is in Iowa.

Nor is

there any showing of conflict between federal policy and state law
,.,.

warranting application of federal law.

Moreover, according to petrs,

the CA did not even apply federal law correctly.

Their principal complain

'

.
- 7
is with theCA's holding that the absence of identifiable land in
place, i.e., land that can be identified as having been severed from
the opposite bank of the river, is of little probative value in deciding
the accretion/avulsion issue.

It is not the rapidity of the change

but the character of the change which is important.
Finally, they claim theCA's conclusion on accretion is contrary
to the evidence.
B.

Noo 78-161:

The State of Iowa emphasizes that it is a state,

not a white person, and the CA erred in applying the § 194 presumption
to ito

c.

Generally it makes the same arguments as petrs in No. 78-160.
No. 78-162:

Petrs in this case focus on what they term§ 194's

invidious discrimination on the basis of race.

They also note that the

statute is arbitrary, there is no rational link between ownership in
1867 and ownership in 1977.

And since accretion/avulsion issues with

a 100 year time-frame are simply impossible, the party with the burden
of proof loseso

Therefore, petrs conclude that § 194 is also, for all

practical purposes, an irrebuttable presumption.

Section 194 has

essentially lain dormant for 140 years, but, according to petrs, it will
increasingly be resorted to now in Indian land disputes, which have had
a much publicized resurgence in recent years.
subject it to plenary review at this time.
supra.

Therefore this court shoulc

They distinguish Mancari,

There this Court was concerned with a statutory preference

for Indians as employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

That pre-

ference was obviously rationally related to the activities of BIA.

- 8 -

D.

ResEs:

Indian Tribe.

Responses have been filed by the SG and the Omaha
The SG relies on this court's opinions in Mancari, supra,

and United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977), for the proposition
that legislation that singles out Indians for special treatment will be
upheld as long as the special treatment is rati8nally related to
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligations toward the Indians.

Here

the special obligation is protection of the most valuable asset of
Congress' Indian wards
§

their land.

194 issue is not ripe for review.

The SG also argues that the
This is a case of first impression

and there is no conflict in the circuits.

The constitutionality of § 194

was only given cursory scrutiny by the courts below.

For the same

reason he would counsel against plenary review of the various statutory
interpretation·issues raised by petrs.

He defends those interpretations

by invoking the maxim that statutes enacted for the protection of the
Indians should be liberally
county, 426

u.s.

con~trued. -

373, 392 (1976).

See,

~,

Bryan v. Itasca

He adds that to construe the statute

to only apply to claims of individual Indians, and not to those of
tribes, would be to rob the statute of most of its protective qualities,
since as a general matter whatever title an Indian has is shared with
the tribe.

He also argues that theCA 8's broad reading of "white person

best comports with the statute's purpose.
The SG also contends that the CA was correct to apply federal law.
Although the boundary between Iowa and Nebraska is, as of 1943, governed
by a compact, the changes at issue in this case occurred before that

- 9
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time, therefore they did linplicate an interstate boundary.

Also, citing

Oneida, supra, he relies on the special federal interest in the protection of possessory rights to tribal land.

The SG also adopts the

CA's position on the proper characteristics of an avulsion.
The Tribe argues that the constitutionality of § 194 need not be
considered in this case.

It argues that petrs voluntarily assumed

the burden of proof because they attempted to show in the trial court
that the land did not in fact belong to the Tribe.

As best as I under-

stand it, this contention seems to be that if a defendant voluntarily
~ubmits

evidence on the ultimate issue at trial, he voluntarily assumes

the burden of proof.

I know of no precedent for that argument and the

Tribe cites noneo
In response to the constitutional and statutory challenges to
theCA's reading of§ 194, the Tribe relies heavily on this Court's
traditional deference to

India~

legislation.

The Tribe also questions

whether Iowa has any land at issue in this caseo
E.

Amici:

There are four briefs for Amici Curiae, representing

30 states, the American Land Title Association, and farm owners in Iowa.
All were filed in support of petrs.
4.

DISCUSSION:

Of t .he numerous issues raised in these petns, some

are clearly not certworthy.

It would be extremely difficult for this

court to articulate a useful definition of avulsion for purposes of
federal common law.
of

th~

~ ·

The only salutery outcome might be the discarding

metaphysics of accretion/avulsion entirely.

But this case

- 10 (

essentially

involve~urdens

of proof, the ' CA found that the DC's

finding of accretion was erroneous and that the evidence was too
speculative to draw any conclusion on avulsion or accretion.

So it

does not provide an appropriate vehicle for dealing with the accretion/
avulsion issue.
The argument that § 194 applies only to actions by individual
Indians, not tribes, is hypertechnical and unconvincing and would
clearly undermine the protection that section affords.

The same is

true of the DC's argument that the Indians must prove an avulsion before
§ 194 comes into play at all.

The application of federal common law

is more questionable, but defensible insofar as movements of the Missouri
during the times at issue (largely. pre-1943) also altered the boundary
between Nebraska and Iowa.

It would not independently warrant cert.

The constitutional and statutory interpretation challenges to the
CA' s handling. . of § 194 are substa!ltial. - The CA s definition of "white
man" is inconsistent with this Court's interpretation of a similar
phrase in another statute. United States y, Perryman, 100 u.s. 235
although
(1880). Andlthis court has time and again upheld legislation that
singled out Indians for special treatment'

~,

United States v .

Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977); Fisher v. District Court, 424
(1976);

u.s.

382

most of these cases have relied on the special sovereignty

attributes of the Indian tribe o

That logic is not clearly applicable

to legislation like § 194.
The preference legislation such as that at issue in Mancari is

.
I
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most closely analogous.

But in Mancari the Court did feel compelled

to analyze whether the employment preference statute was "directly
related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal."
goals:

It found two such

furthering the cause of Indian self-government and making the

BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituentgroups.
} is more

l

~r

Mancari:

Section 194

to a statute the court emphasized was not before it in

a blanket civil service preference for Indians.

There are responses by SG and Tribe.
CA & DC opR in app.

Haar
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1.

Statutory interpretation of § 194.

The SG points out

that the phrase "white person" in the reiJaration statute considered
in Perryman had a legislative history that specifically excluded
blacks from the ambit of the statute.

Prior to 1834, the Perryman

6ourt noted, the statute had made the United States liable for
injuries to the property of friendly Indians by any person.

As

the Court also noted, in 1834 the Cherokee nation was about to
remove from Ga. to its new western lands.
coverage of the reparation statute to

11

By restricting the

white persons, 11 Congress

aimed at making the Indians less likely to tolerate fugitive
black slaves in their country.

As the SG points out, there is no

comparable history of the phrase "white person" in §194.
2.

Constitutionality of § 194.

If the § 194 burden

of proof were applied to a title dispute beuween a single Indian
and another person over fee land unassociated with an Indian
reservation, then the case might be analogous to the general
civil service preference law mentioned in Mancari.

But here,

where the title dispute has to do with part of the Omaha Tribe 1 s
reservation, I think the special treatment of the Indians is
jllitifiable by reference to their sovereign status and the history
~

of relatiOns between them and the United States.
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CHAMBERS OF

J US T ICE BYRON R. WHITE

November 7, 1978

MEMO TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

~

v

Nos. 78-160, 78-161 & 78-162
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe
Iowa v. Omaha Indian Tribe
RGP, Inc., v. Ohama Indian Tribe

·;f.

The Conference was interested in
limiting the possible grants in these
cases to the questions of whether federal
or state law controlled and whether § 194,
the burden of proof section, applied against
a state. With this in mind, the grant in
No. 78-160 should be limited to question 2,
which includes the issue whether Iowa should
be considered a "white person" for the purposes of § 194 and question 3 going to the
federal-state law issue. In No. 78-161, the
state's petition, question 1 poses the § 194
matter and question 4 the controlling law
issue. No. 78-162 raises neither question
but perhaps should be held.
Sincerely yours,
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May 29, 1979

78-160 Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe

Dear Byron:
I

Please show on the next draft of your opinion that
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

·,
•'

..

-

,Sn:punu Qfltttrlltf f:lrt> ~nittb ,i\hdts-

Jlas-.lfingtltlt. ~. "f.

2ll~'

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS

/

May 30, 1979

Re:

78-160 - Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe
78-161 - Iowa v. Omaha Indian Tribe

Dear Byron:
Although I had originally intended to write
a dissent, your opinion has convinced me to join.
Please join me.
Respectfully,

n
( })
I

/

;-

' ~"i;~ \..-

"

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

·.

~up-rmu

<!}curl of flp~ %tiftlt ~taft$'
~w.rfrin.gtvn.l9. <!}. '20~'k~

CHAM BERS OF

.JUSTICE

w... . J .

May 30, 1979

BR E NNAN, .JR.

RE:

Nos. 78-160 & 161 Wilson & Iowa v. Omaha Indian
Tribe

Dear Byron:
I was the other way but I give up.

Your very

persuasive opinion carries the day with me.
join me.

Please
;

•
Sincerely,

.,

Mr. Justice White
cc: The Conference

-

.§upnntt C!Jl!ltrl ttf f:lrr 1Jlnittb .§hdt.s
1Jil'MJri:ttghtu. ~. C!J. 2l1p)!. j

CHAMBERS OF

May 31, 1979

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

Re:

78-160 and 78-161 - Wilson v. Omaha Indian
Tribe, etc.

Dear Byron:
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

..

or llttrt llf tlft ~ttittb .italta
'DasJriugfClt, gl. or. 2ll6i'l-.;l

~ltpUlltt

/

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May 31, 1979

Re:

Nos.

78~160

& 161 - Wilson & Iowa v. Omaha
Indian Tribe

Dear Byron:
I give up.

Please join me.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice White
cc:

The Conference

Q}l!ltrlaf flrt ~ta .jtaf.tg
._,rudpnghttt. ~. <!}. 211,?~~

.jnp:r.ttm

CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

May 31, 1979

Re:

Nos. 78-160 and 78-161 - Wilson v. Omaha Indian
Tribe, et al.

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

I~
I

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMSERS Of'

JUSTICE HARRY A .

June 4, 1979

BLACKMU~

Re:

No. 78-160 - Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe
No. 78-161 - Iowa _v. Omaha Indian Tribe

Dear Byron:
Please join me.
separate concurrence.

I shall be writing a paragraph in

Sincerely,

j/at.

Mr. Justice White
cc:

The Conference
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